【英译中】The Power of Amphibious Operations in the 21st Century 21世纪两栖作战的力量/作用

Mik April 19, 2019, 9:08 p.m.
Translation exercises

The Power of Amphibious Operations in the 21st Century
21世纪两栖作战的力量/作用

By Daniel Gouré
丹尼尔•古雷(Daniel Gouré)

Predicting the demise of amphibious warfare has been a hobby for many military historians, defense analysts and even veterans. The advent of new military capabilities, such as jet aircraft, quiet attack submarines, ballistic and cruise missiles, long-range intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and, of course, nuclear weapons, repeatedly caused the U.S. defense establishment to question the feasibility of large-scale amphibious operations. Most recently, critics point to the rise of so-called anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities.
预测两栖战争的“灭亡”(即退出历史舞台)一直是许多军事历史学家、国防分析家甚至退伍军人的爱好。喷气式飞机、静音攻击潜艇、弹道导弹和巡航导弹、远程情报、监视和侦察,当然还有核武器等新军事能力(即新军事武器与手段)的出现,一再使美国国防机构质疑大规模两栖作战的可行性。最近,有批评者指出了所谓的反介入/区域拒止 (A2/AD)能力的兴起。

However, to paraphrase Mark Twain, reports of the death of amphibious warfare have always been greatly exaggerated. Historically, amphibious operations evolved in response to the rise of new defensive capabilities. In many instances, the same technologies were employed both by the amphibious assault forces and by the defenders on the beach.
然而,套用马克•吐温的话来说,关于两栖战争消亡(亦即退出历史舞台)的报道总是被夸大了。从历史的角度来看,两栖作战是为了应对新的防御能力的崛起而发展起来的。在许多情况下,两栖攻击部队和海滨上的防御者都采用了同样的技术。

Those concerned about the anti-ship cruise mis-sile threat to U.S. amphibious forces should recall that during the battle of Okinawa, the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet experienced some 4,000 Japanese air strikes, including nearly 2,000 by the 1944 equivalent of a cruise missile, the kamikaze. The current A2/AD challenge is only the latest turn of the great of-fense-defense wheel.
那些担心反舰巡航导弹对美国两栖部队构成威胁的人应该记得,在冲绳战役期间,美国海军第五舰队遭受了约4000次日本空袭,其中包括1944年相当于巡航导弹“神风”(Kamikaze)的近2000次空袭。当前的A2/AD挑战(或困境、艰难处境)只是这种伟大的攻防之轮的又最新一轮。

It is worth pointing out that in modern times most amphibious operations have been successful in terms of achieving operational surprise, defeating shore defenses and putting a large number of troops and equipment ashore. The number of modern am-phibious operations that were defeated on beaches can be counted on one hand. A larger number, but still a relative handful, failed to exploit an initial, successful landing by moving inland and thus were bottled up on the beachhead.
值得指出的是,现代大多数两栖作战都取得了令人惊讶的作战效果,击败了岸上防御,部署了大量登陆部队和装备。在海滩上能够被打败的现代两栖作战的数量屈指可数。更多的人(但仍然是相对较少的)未能利用最初的、成功的登陆,移动到内陆,因此被困在了滩头上。

Major amphibious operations profoundly changed the course of the conflict in a major theater. Examples of such operations include the Japanese campaigns in Malaya and the Philippines, the Allied landings in North Africa, Sicily, Salerno and Normandy, MacArthur’s campaign in the Southwest Pacific, the Inchon landing during the Korean War and the British liberation on the Falkland Islands.
重大两栖作战深刻地改变了一个主要战区的冲突进程。此类行动的例子包括日本在马来亚和菲律宾的战役、盟军在北非、西西里、萨勒诺和诺曼底的登陆、麦克阿瑟在西南太平洋的战役、朝鲜战争期间的仁川登陆以及英国解放福克兰群岛。

Ironically, the rise of the A2/AD threat only served to increase the value of amphibious forces. After the end of the Cold War, the U.S. withdrew most forward-deployed forces from Europe and East Asia, preferring a posture based on expeditionary deploy-ments from the continental U.S. With the rise of high-end threats in regions of interest, the U.S. faced a serious challenge to its access regions.
具有讽刺意味的是,A2/AD威胁的增加只会使得两栖部队的价值上升。冷战结束后,美国从欧洲和东亚撤出了大部分前沿部署的部队,更倾向于以美国大陆为基础的远征部署。随着相关地区高端威胁的增加,美国的准入地区面临严重挑战。

The military needs to find ways around the A2/AD threat. Part of the answer will be technologi-cal. But as former Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work observed, success against an adversary with robust A2/AD capabilities will also require agile maneuver by amphibious forces, including large forcible entry operations.
军方需要找到解决A2/AD威胁的方法。有部分答案可以从技术层面找到。但正如前国防部副部长罗伯特•沃克(Robert Work)所言,成功对抗具有强大A2/AD能力的对手,也需要两栖部队灵活机动,包括大规模强行进入的行动。

Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) and their embarked Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) could be particularly useful in countering A2/AD systems. Forward deployed ARG/MEUs would be inside an adversary’s defensive umbrella. This might seem to be a vulnerable position, but, if properly sized and equipped, these formations could act from the opening of hostilities to blow holes in enemy defenses.
两栖准备群(ARG)及其海军陆战队远征部队(MEUS)在对抗A2/AD系统时特别有用。前沿部署的ARG/MEUS处在敌人的防御范围之内。这可能看起来是一个脆弱(或比较危险)的位置,但如果(行动)规模和装备得当,这些编队可以采取行动,从敌对行动开始,然后在敌人的防御工事上“打洞”(亦即进行破坏活动)。

In addition to defeating hostile A2/AD systems, U.S. combatant commands will need to create their own version of an A2/AD “umbrella” in support of forward-deployed forces and allies and to deny an enemy’s ability to attack our air and sea lines of communications. The currently fashionable concept of Multi-Domain Battle envisions U.S. land forces not only conducting defensive operations but also offensive strikes against enemy targets from forward bases. If such positions do not exist or have been overrun, they must be seized or liberated. Hence, the role for major amphibious operations.
除了击败敌对的A2/AD系统外,美国作战指挥部还需要建立自己的A2/AD“保护伞”(亦即防御范围),以支持前沿部署的部队和盟友,并阻止敌人攻击自己的空中和海上通信线路。目前流行的多领域作战概念设想,美国陆军不仅要进行防御行动,还要从前沿基地对敌人目标进行进攻打击。如果这些阵地不存在或已被攻占,就必须予以围攻或解放行动。此即两栖作战的主要任务。

The Navy and Marine Corps are acquiring new platforms and systems that will enhance the effectiveness of amphibious forces in operations across the spectrum of conflict. The stealthy F-35B, able to operate from large deck amphibs and small airfields, provides a particularly useful capability for attacking defended targets and providing targeting information for other platforms and weapons systems. Improved ship-to-shore connectors, including the MV-22 Osprey, the CH-53K heavy-lift helicopter, and air cushion landing craft will enable Marine Corps units to project power onto the land further and faster.
海军和海军陆战队将获得新的平台和系统,这些平台和系统将增强两栖部队在各种冲突中的作战能力。可以隐身的F-35B能够在大型甲板两栖和小型机场中进行操作,可以为攻击防御目标,以及为其他平台和武器系统提供目标信息,这是一种极为有用的能力。改进的舰对岸连接器(包括MV-22鱼鹰、CH-53K重型直升机和气垫登陆艇)将使海军陆战队能够更快地将电力投射到陆地上。

The impact of new aviation assets on future am-phibious operations cannot be overestimated. An analysis about the future of amphibious operations by the RAND Corporation observed that “Marine Corps aviation is on a path to significantly alter what even ARG/MEUs are capable of doing, and it is important to shape the rest of the force to acknowledge this change. An ARG/MEU with F-35Bs and MV-22s is not just capable of local influence, but can project power and provide defense in ways impossible just a few years ago.”
新的航空设备(或工具)对未来两栖作战的影响是不可低估的。兰德公司(RAND Corporation)对未来两栖作战的分析指出,“海军陆战队的航空能力正在使ARG/MEUS能做到的事情发生极大地改变,而且使得其他部队以承认/认可这一变化也很重要。装备F-35B和MV-22S的ARG/MEU不仅具有地方影响力,而且还能投射力量并提供防御保护,这在几年前是不可能做到的。“

More needs to be done to exploit the potential of amphibious warfare forces in the 21st Century. First and foremost, the Navy needs to acquire additional amphibious warfare vessels. The minimum desired level is 38 ships, the number needed to lift 2.5 Marine Expeditionary Brigades and the number required to conduct a major landing operation. Several analyses propose higher numbers, between 40 to 50 ships. In addition, the Navy needs to move forward with its plans to procure additional Landing Helicopter Assault ships, capable of operating the F-35B and MV-22, and to replace its aging Landing Ship Dock fleet with the larger and more capable LR(X).
要开发21世纪两栖作战力量/作用的潜力,还有更多的工作亟待完成。首先,海军需要获得更多的两栖战舰。这一数量的最低水平是38艘,相当于2.5个海军远征旅的数量,亦即进行一次重大登陆行动所需的数量。一些分析提出了更高的数目,比如在40至50艘之间。此外,海军需要推进其计划,采购更多能够操作F-35B和MV-22的登陆型直升机攻击舰,并用更大和更有能力的LR(X)取代其老化的登陆舰码头舰队。

In anticipation of combat with more capable ad-versaries, U.S. amphibious forces will require greater reach and lethality. A study by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments proposes, inter alia, en-hancing the aviation elements in the ARG/MEU, providing both amphibious ships and landing force with long-range fires and improving air and missile defense capabilities.
可以预想,在与装备能力更佳的敌人作战中,美国两栖部队将需要更大的触及范围和更强的杀伤力。战略和预算评估中心的一项研究提出,除去其它因素,需要加强ARG/MEU的航空部门,要为两栖舰艇和登陆部队提供远程火力,并提高空中和导弹防御能力。

The Marine Corps is looking for ways to provide its truck-mounted High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) with an anti-ship capability. It recently experimented with firing the HIMARS from the deck of an amphib. The Army’s Long-Range Protected Fires program, one of the service’s mod-ernization priorities, also could be useful for long-range strikes by amphibious warfare forces. Naval forces operating within an adversary’s A2/AD umbrella could carry large numbers of cheap drones equipped with jammers and other electronic warfare systems to blind sensors and interrupt networks.
海军陆战队正在想方设法为其车载高机动火炮系统(HIMARS)提供反舰能力。最近,它尝试从一个圆形平台上发射HIMARS。陆军的远程精确火力计划(亦即该部队的现代化工程重点之一)也可能对两栖作战部队的远程打击有用。海军部队在敌人的A2/AD伞(亦即防御范围)内作战,可以携带大量装有干扰器和其他电子战系统的廉价无人机,以屏蔽传感器、中断网络。

Properly sized and configured and employing the right operational concepts, U.S. amphibious forces could be a powerful tool in a combatant commander’s arsenal.
装备适当的规模和配置,并采用正确的作战理念,美国的两栖部队可以成为一个战斗指挥官武器库中的一支强大力量。

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